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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 6500/2025**

DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS

.....Petitioners

Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Mr. Sandeep Gupta, Ms. Deepti Verma, Mr. Rishabh Rai and Mr. Yeshraj, Advs.

versus

L G GNCTD AND ORS

.....Respondents

Through: Mr. Pinaki Misra, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Puneet Mittal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Bhuvan Gugnani, Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Mr. Sameer Vatts, Mr. Abhisumat Gupta, Mr. Rupender Sharma and Ms. Nupur Mantoo, Advs. for DPS Dwarka.
Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for DoE.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

ORDER

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16.05.2025

CM APPL. 29606/2025, CM APPL. 29607/2025 & CM APPL. 29608/2025 (exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The applications stand disposed of.

W.P.(C) 6500/2025

3. The present petition has been filed seeking following reliefs:

“a. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to decide the pending representations of the Petitioners within a period of two weeks and;

b. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to call upon the entire record which is part of this Writ Petition and any other record which the Respondent No. 1 from the office of



the Respondent DOE, Delhi which seems appropriate to ascertain and examine the non-compliance by the school of the administrative and judicial orders of the DOE, Delhi and this Hon'ble Court respectively and;

*c. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue written directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi to ensure strict compliance with the directions dated 19.01.2016 of the Ld. Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in **"Justice for all vs. GNCTD of Delhi and Ors."** in W.P. (C) bearing no. 4109 of 2013 and the Review Order dated 27.07.2016 and the Order dated 23.01.2017 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) 8026/2016 and 6046/2016 and the Order dated 27.10.2022 in LPA - 230/2019 and no unapproved fee at any cost shall be charged from the Petitioners/Parents of the school, unless approved by the DOE, Delhi.*

d. Issue appropriate directions to Respondent No. 1 to issue appropriate directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi of permanent nature to ensure no discrimination shall take place against any child in any manner and the recommendations of the Ld. District Magistrate and a team of officers of DOE, Delhi dated 04.04.2025 should be circulated in the larger interest of the interest of the students studying in the school."

4. The petitioners in the present case are the parents of students studying in Delhi Public School, Dwarka (hereinafter referred as 'DPS-Dwarka' or 'the school'). The case of the petitioners as set out in the writ petition is that the respondent no.3/DoE had passed an administrative order dated 22.05.2024 in exercise of its powers under Section 18(5) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'the Act') read with Sections 17(3), 24(1) of the Act and Rule 180(3) of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred as 'the Rules'), thereby rejecting the fee hike proposal of the school pertaining to the academic year 2023-24. The directions passed in the said order dated 22.05.2024 are as under:



“Further, the management of said School is hereby directed under section 24(3) of DSEAR 1973 to comply with the following directions:

1. Not to increase any fee in pursuance to the proposal submitted by school on any account for the academic session 2023-24 and if the fee is already increased and charged for the academic session 2023-24, the same shall be refunded to the parents or adjusted in the fee of subsequent months.

2. To ensure payment of salary is made in accordance with the provision of Section 10(1) of the DSEA, 1973. Further, the scarcity of funds cannot be the reason for non-payment of salary and other benefits admissible to the teachers/staffs in accordance with the section 10(1) of the DSEA, 1973. Therefore, the Society running the school must ensure payment to teachers/staffs accordingly.

3. To utilize the fee collected from students in accordance with the provisions of Rule 177 of the DSER, 1973 and orders and directions issued by this Directorate from time to time.”

Non-compliance of this order or any direction herein shall be viewed seriously and will be dealt with the accordance with the provisions of section 24(4) of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and Delhi School Education Rules, 1973”

5. The grievance ventilated in the petition is *inter alia* that the aforesaid order has neither been complied with by the school, nor has the DoE made any efforts to enforce its own order despite there being several requests, communications and complaints by the parents. It is stated that the school, in complete disregard of the order dated 22.05.2024, has not only failed to refund the excess and unapproved fee charged by them, but on the contrary, has been demanding increased fee from the parents and striking off the names of their wards from school rolls, thereby harassing them and not allowing them to sit in the classes.

6. It has further been stated that pursuant to the order dated 22.05.2024,



the DoE has subsequently passed the order dated 28.05.2024 against the Management of DPS-Dwarka, directing them *inter alia* not to put the students to any academic loss, ensuring that no student is subjected to ill treatment and that they are allowed to continue in the respective classes for their studies. The relevant part of the said order reads as under:

“Now, in view of the above, the Management of DPS, Dwarka, New Delhi is hereby directed that the students are not put to any academic loss, there should not be any ill treatment to the students and the students should be allowed to continue in the class for their studies and to appear in the Mid Term Examination also in the interest of their studies. There should not be any discrimination among the students and studies of students should not suffer. The management of DPS, Dwarka, New Delhi is further directed to comply with the orders No.F.DE.15(94)/PSB/2024/2464-2469 dated 22.05.2024 and submit the compliance of the order.”

7. The DoE, thereafter, passed another order dated 05.06.2024 on the various complaints from the parents, whereby taking note of the fact that the school has neither complied with the aforesaid orders of the DoE, nor has it furnished any reply to the same, it directed the school to re-instate the names of the students whose names have been struck off from the school rolls for not paying the unapproved hiked fee. The DoE also reiterated the observations and directions contained in its previous orders. The relevant part of the order dated 05.06.2024 reads as under:

“And whereas, this office is in receipt of several complaints from the parents mentioning that the Delhi Public School, Sec.-3, Dwarka has not yet reinstated the names of their wards who have not paid the unapproved hiked fee, further some aggrieved parents have visited this office on 03.06.2024 & 05.06.2024 and met DDE, Zone-21 alongwith their written submission that their issues have not been resolved yet and name of their wards have not been



reinstated by the school.

In view of the above, the Principal/Manager of Delhi Public School, Sec.-3, Dwarka, Delhi is again directed to reinstate the names of students whose names were struck off from the school rolls. It is also directed that the students are not put to any academic loss, there should not be any ill-treatment to the students and there should not be any discrimination among the students and comply with the directions issued by this office vide order dated 28.05.2024.

Non Compliance of the directions will be viewed seriously and the matter will be taken up with competent authority for initiating necessary actions as per provisions of DSEAR, 1973.”

8. Similar orders have been passed by the DoE to the Management of the school on 31.12.2024 and 27.03.2025 directing compliance of the earlier orders and furnishing a compliance report in that regard by 28.03.2025.

9. It is stated that subsequently, the DoE *vide* order dated 03.04.2025 constituted a committee for carrying out inspection of DPS-Dwarka on 04.04.2025 and directed the said committee to visit the school, verify the veracity of the complaints received by the office of DoE regarding any discriminatory tactic being employed by the school against the students and submit a report. The said committee submitted its report dated 04.04.2025 wherein it observed that on the basis of fee hike dispute the students were not allowed regular classes, rather they were made to sit in the library. Consequently, the DoE issued a show cause notice dated 08.04.2025 to the school as a final notice before initiation of action under Section 24(3) read with Rule 56 of DSEAR, 1973.

10. Taking cognizance of the findings in the aforesaid report dated 04.04.2025, this Court in W.P.(C) 10434/2024, wherein the school has challenged the action initiated at the instance of National Commission for



Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), passed the following directions *vide* order dated 16.04.2025:

“10. In the meantime, as an interim measure, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner school is restrained from indulging in the kind of conduct referred to in the inspection report viz.

- (i) confining the students in the library of the school;*
- (ii) preventing students from attending classes;*
- (iii) segregating the students who have not paid the fees;*
- (iv) preventing the said students from interacting with the other students;*
- (v) preventing the said students from having access to all amenities of the school.*
- (vi) subjecting such students to any other form of discrimination / prejudice.*

11. The school will also allocate section/s to students who have been promoted to the next/ higher class; any controversy/ dispute as regards fees shall not be a ground for not doing so. As observed herein above, any controversy/ dispute as regards the fees to be charged by the school shall be resolved in the manner contemplated under the statute and the rules framed thereunder, and/or in terms of direction/s issued in pending judicial proceedings, where the said issue is under consideration.

12. The Respondent/DOE and the concerned District Magistrate are directed to conduct regular inspections to ensure that the above directions are complied with.”

11. It has further been stated that although, the school has assailed the orders of the DoE rejecting fee hike proposals of DPS-Dwarka and the said challenge is pending before this Court under Writ Petitions bearing no. 12232/2022, 12254/2022, 11653/2022 and 14640/2024, however, no stay on operation of the orders of the DoE has been granted. It is thus, stated that the said orders are still in operation and ought to be complied with.

12. Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the



petitioners submits that the school, being a private unaided recognized school, which has been allotted land by Delhi Development Authority with the condition to seek prior approval from the DoE before increasing the fee, is bound to comply with the same. In this regard, he places reliance on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in ***Justice for All v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 355*** (hereinafter referred as '***Justice for All I***') and the order dated 27.07.2016 passed in the subsequent Review Petition No.129/2016 in ***Justice for All v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors.*** (hereinafter referred as '***Justice for All II***'). He has further referred to the order dated 23.01.2017 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP(C) 8026/2016 and 6046/2016 whereby the SLP filed by the schools with the land allotment clause were dismissed outrightly by the Full Bench, to contend that the law laid down by the Division Bench has attained finality and therefore, is binding upon the school as well as the DoE.

13. Mr. Gupta submits that reliance placed by the school, time and again, on the decision of this Court in ***Action Committee v. Directorate of Education & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7591*** (hereinafter referred as '***Action Committee I***') is misplaced inasmuch as the said judgment is in appeal before the Division Bench of this Court in LPA 230/2019, wherein *vide* order dated 15.03.2019, the said judgment has been stayed. The order of stay passed by the Division Bench has been made absolute *vide* order dated 27.10.2022.

14. He further contends that the school is bound by the conditions stipulated in the letter of allotment once the same have been accepted. He submits that the allottee cannot breach the terms of the allotment and indulge in profiteering with the aid of public property. In this regard, he



relies on the decision of the Division Bench in *Social Jurist, A Lawyer's Group vs. GNCT of Delhi and Ors., 140 (2007) DLT 698*.

15. Having heard Mr. Gupta, and regard being had to the nature of relief sought in the present petition, as well as, the interim relief, this Court is of the opinion that the Delhi Public School, Dwarka is a necessary party.

16. Accordingly, on oral request of Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners, Delhi Public School, Dwarka is impleaded as respondent no.4. Let amended memo of parties be filed before the next date.

17. In view of the submissions noted above, issue notice. Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for GNCTD accepts notice on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3. Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta accepts notice on behalf of the respondent no.4/DPS, Dwarka.

18. Let counter-affidavit be filed within a period of four weeks from today.

19. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter.

20. Re-notify on 28.08.2025.

CM APPL. 29605/2025 (by the petitioners under Section 151 CPC seeking interim relief)

21. The interim reliefs sought by the petitioners in the present application are as under:

“a) Issue appropriate directions/orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue direction to the Respondent DOE, Delhi that till the final disposal of the instant Writ Petition, the DOE, Delhi shall ensure that the School of the Petitioner's ward shall strictly comply with the Order of the Division Bench, Review Order, Supreme Court and the Order dated 27.10.2022 passed in LPA 230/2019 and;

b) Issue appropriate direction/s orders to the Respondent No. 1 to issue directions to the Respondent DOE, Delhi that till the final



disposal of the instant Writ Petition, the DOE, Delhi shall ensure that the school of the Petitioner's wards shall strictly charge only the approved fee for the academic session 2025-26 and onwards in the light of the judgment."

22. Issue notice. Mr. Sameer Vashishtha, Standing Counsel for GNCTD accepts notice on behalf of the respondents 1 to 3. Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta accepts notice on behalf of the DPS, Dwarka.

23. Let reply to the application be filed within a period of four weeks from today.

24. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within two weeks thereafter.

25. At the outset it may be specifically stated that any discrimination and victimization of the students on the ground of non-payment of hiked fee cannot be countenanced. The school and the DoE shall remain bound by the interim directions passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) 10434/2024 *vide* order dated 16.04.2025, relevant part of which has been extracted in paragraph 10 above.

26. The petitioners in the present application have questioned the proposed fee hike for the current academic year 2025-26 and any further hikes for subsequent years as being contrary to the judgments in ***Justice for All I*** and ***Justice for All II***, as well as, the order of the Division Bench in LPA No. 230/2019. Thus, the case of the petitioners, in concise, is that the decision in ***Action Committee I*** has been stayed, therefore, the school cannot ask for hiked fee without prior approval from DoE.

27. This Court in ***Naya Samaj Parents Association through its Present vs. Apeejay School Sheikh Sarai & Anr., 2025:DHC:4185***, had an occasion to deal with similar submissions. Rejecting the contention that the decision in ***Action Committee I*** could not be relied upon since it has been stayed, this



Court observed as under:

*“28. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, after examining various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as well as, of this Court on the issue, held that what is proscribed is indulgence in profiteering and charging of capitation fee, thereby “commercialising” education, but there is no requirement for the school to take prior approval of the DoE before enhancing its fee. The only obligation on the School under Section 17(3) of the Delhi School Education Act is to submit its statement of fee in terms of the said provision. It was further laid down that if pending the decision of DoE on the School’s Statement of Fee, the school decided to commence charging the enhanced fee from the beginning of the next academic session, it cannot be said that the school had, in any manner, infringed the provisions of the DSE Act or the DSE Rules. Incidentally, the judgment in **Action Committee I**, took note of the decision in **Modern School** (supra), as well as, decision of this Court in **Justice for All** (supra). The relevant para from **Action Committee I** reads thus:*

“207. Proceeding, now, to the merits of the impugned Order, i.e., to the validity of the objection, by the DoE, regarding non-obtaining, by the petitioner, “prior approval” of the DoE, before enhancing its fees, it would become apparent, from a reading of the discussion hereinabove, and the law laid down by the various decisions cited in that regard, that, in the matter of fixation of fees, the distinction, between the rights of unaided non-minority schools, and unaided minority schools, is practically chimerical. In both cases, the schools are entitled to complete autonomy in the matter of fixation of their fees and management of their accounts, subject only to the condition that they do not indulge in profiteering, and do not charge capitation fee, thereby “commercialising” education. There is no requirement for the school to take “prior approval”, of the DoE, before enhancing its fees. The only responsibility, on the School, is to submit its statement of fee, as required by Section 17(3) of the DSE Act. Mr. Gupta is right in his submission that, having done so, the schools could not be expected to



wait ad infinitum, before the said statement of fees, submitted by them, was examined and verified by the DoE. Any such examination and verification, too, it is clarified, would have to be limited to the issue of whether, by fixing its fees, or enhancing the same, the school was “commercialising” education, either by charging capitation fee or by indulging in profiteering. If, therefore, pending the decision of the DoE on its Statement of Fee, the school decided to commence charging the enhanced fee from the beginning of the next academic session, it cannot be said that the school had, in any manner, infringed the provisions of the DSE Act or the DSE Rules.”

(emphasis supplied)

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30. The Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon the decision in the **Action Committee I**, vide order dated 29.04.2024 observed that unaided recognised private schools are not required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fee, irrespective of whether the land clause does or does not apply to it. The Court also noted that the operation of the judgment in **Action Committee I** has not been stayed in the intra court appeal carried to the Hon’ble Division Bench against the said judgment in **LPA 230/2019** titled as **Directorate of Education vs. Action Committee Unaided Recognised Private Schools**, though, interim order was passed only to the extent that the ‘land clause’ school would not collect the amount constituting interim fee hike in terms of order dated 17.10.2017 issued by the DoE. The relevant excerpt from the interim order dated 03.04.2019 passed in **LPA 230/2019** reads thus:

“6. Till the next date of hearing, none of the land clause Schools will proceed to collect the amount constituting the interim fee hike in terms of 17th October 2017 circular issued by Appellant No.1.”

31. In this backdrop, the Court observed that there was no interference, interlocutory or otherwise with the decision of the judgment in **Action Committee I** that, before hiking fees, unaided recognised school is not required to obtain prior approval of the



DoE.

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34. Further, as noted above an interim order was passed in LPA 230/2019 limited to the aspect that none of the land clause Schools will proceed to collect the amount constituting the interim fee hike in terms of 17th October 2017 circular issued by DoE. It is apparent that the said interim direction was issued to preserve the status quo as regard collection of amount constituting interim fee hike in terms of aforesaid circular, till the matter is finally decided in the said LPA laying down a binding precedent.

35. The fact, however, remains that the judgment in Action Committee I has not been quashed or set aside. The law is well settled that even where the operation of a judgment has been stayed or kept in abeyance, the reasoning of the judgment still continues to operate and exist, till the judgment itself is set aside.

36. In this regard, reference could profitably be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod Secretariat, Madras, (1992) 3 SCC 1**, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that a stay on the operation of an order only means that the stayed order would not be operative from the date of passing of the order, and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. The relevant portion of the decision reads as under:

“10..... While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of passing of the stay order, and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the appellate authority is quashed and the matter is remanded, the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the appellate authority



would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the appellate authority after the quashing of the order of the appellate authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority because in spite of the said order, the order of the appellate authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed of and is still pending. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the passing of the interim order dated February 21, 1991 by the Delhi High Court staying the operation of the order of the appellate authority dated January 7, 1991 does not have the effect of reviving the appeal which had been dismissed by the appellate authority by its order dated January 7, 1991 and it cannot be said that after February 21, 1991, the said appeal stood revived and was pending before the appellate authority.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has further been employed by the Division Bench of this Court in **Principal Commissioner of C. Ex., Delhi-I vs. Space Telelink Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12910** wherein the Division Bench observed as follows:

“8. The revalue has argued that the Supreme Court has entertained a Special Leave Petition against the judgment of the Gujarat and Madras High Courts and furthermore, granted a stay of proceedings and that in these circumstances, the law declared in those judgments are no longer applicable : This sub mission is fallacious because in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association, (1992) 3 SCC 1, the Supreme Court had observed as follows:

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*9. It is apparent therefore, that **an order keeping in abeyance the judgment of a lower Court or authority does not deface the underlying basis of the judgment itself, i.e.***



its reasoning.”

(emphasis supplied)

38. *In regard to the submission of Mr. Jha that the view taken by this Court in **Action Committee II** is only a tentative view and does not have a binding value, it is to be noted that order in **Action Committee II** has relied upon this Court’s earlier judgment in **Action Committee I** which continues to hold the field. Therefore, the law expounded in **Action Committee I** that the schools are not required to obtain prior approval for increasing tuition fee irrespective of whether it is land clause school or not, as noted in **Action Committee II**, is the extant legal position.”*

28. Therefore, the law as it stands today, permits the school to fix the fee fees as per its projected expenses without prior approval of the DoE. However, the statement of fee submitted by school before the commencement of each academic session, in terms of Section 17(3) of the DSE Act, is subject to the decision of DoE since under the said provision the DoE has the authority to regulate the quantum of fee charged by unaided schools. Thus, it is open to DoE to see whether such fixation is irrational or arbitrary which results in “profiteering” or “commercialisation”. If the DoE finds in affirmative, it can pass an appropriate order, including an order rejecting enhancement of fee with consequent direction to roll back the hiked fee.

29. To be noted, the issue regarding fee hike concerning academic year 2023-24 has already been reviewed and decided by the DoE *vide* order dated 22.05.2024, whereby the DoE has rejected the fee hike after duly analysing the audited financial statements of the school. The said order has been challenged by the school by filing W.P.(C) 14640/2024 but no stay has been granted in the said petition. Therefore, the school has to comply with the order dated 22.05.2024 passed by the DoE, till the time it is stayed or set



aside.

30. However, the interim relief sought by the petitioners in the present case with regard to the subsequent academic years including current year 2025-26 does not persuade this Court inasmuch as nothing has been placed on record to show that the DoE has rejected the fixation of fee by the school for the academic session 2024-25 onwards. Until and unless the DoE reviews the financial statements of the school and on its findings, rejects the statement of fee providing for enhancement for the academic sessions 2024-25 onwards on the touch stone of “profiteering” and “commercialisation” of education, the enunciation of law as noted above does not provide for any embargo on such enhancement of fee.

31. In that view of the matter, the parents of the students studying in DPS-Dwarka ought to pay the fee as per the statements of fee submitted by the school for the academic sessions 2024-25 onwards, till the time the DoE takes a decision on the same, and further subject to the final outcome of the present writ petition.

32. Mr. Pinaki Misra and Mr. Puneet Mittal, learned senior counsels appearing on behalf of respondent no.4/DPS-Dwarka, on instructions, fairly state that the school is amenable to the petitioners paying 50% of the hiked school fee.

33. Therefore, it is directed that the wards of the petitioners shall be allowed to continue their studies in their respective classes till the pendency of the present petition subject to the parents depositing 50% of the hiked school fee for the academic years 2024-25 onwards. It is clarified that the rebate of 50% is on the hiked component of the fee, the base fee shall be paid in full. It is further clarified that the dues in terms of the present order



with regard to the wards of the petitioners shall be calculated after adjusting the excess fee collected for the year 2023-24, in terms of DoE's order dated 22.05.2024. The parties are, however, at liberty to seek variation or modification of the directions contained in the present order, in the altered circumstances.

34. At this stage, Mr. Pinaki Misra, learned Senior Counsel for Delhi Public School, Dwarka has drawn attention of the Court to certain complaints filed with the Bar Council of India by some of the petitioners in the present case against Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate. The said complaint alleges misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961 and further alleges delaying the proceedings of this Court. In the complaint, it has been alleged that the learned senior counsel sought adjournment before this Court in a connected matter citing personal difficulties, however, on the same date, he was appearing before another Bench of this Court.

35. Mr. Manish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners' states that any such complaint by any of the petitioners was not filed in consultation with him and he also expresses his disapproval for the action taken by the parents.

36. In the considered opinion of this Court, such complaints made by the parents are unwarranted and unacceptable. The order relied upon by the parents have been completely misread whereby adjournment was sought on personal grounds of the briefing counsel and not of the learned senior counsel. It has to be borne in mind that advocates appearing for either side before this Court are officers in assistance of this Court and they ought to be respected as such. The parties shall refrain from writing about counsels appearing for the opposite sides. Mr. Gupta is requested to counsel the



petitioners in this regard.

37. Re-notify on 28.08.2025.

MAY 16, 2025
N.S. ASWAL

VIKAS MAHAJAN, J



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 8597/2024**

DIVYA MATTEY & ORS.

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Mr. Sandeep Gupta and Mr. Hitendra Nahata, Advs.

versus

GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. Respondents

Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, SC (Civil) with Mr. Arun Panwar, Adv. for R-1 & R-2 (GNCTD & DOE).
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. R.P. Singh and Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Adv. for R-3/DPS Dwarka.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN

ORDER

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07.06.2024

CM APPL. 35199/2024 (Exemption)

1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. Application is disposed of.

W.P.(C) 8597/2024 & CM APPL. 35198/2024 (interim relief)

3. The present petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:-

a. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent No.1 and 2 (office of the DOE, Delhi) to direct the Respondent No.3 School to implement the Order of reinstatement dated 15.05.2024 with immediate effect.

b. Issue appropriate directions/Orders to the Respondent School



to strictly comply with the directions of the Ld. Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Justice for all vs. GNCTD of Delhi and Ors. In W.P. (C) bearing no. 4109 of 2013 and LPA – 230/2019 and no unapproved fee at any cost shall be charged from the Petitioners/Parents of the school, unless approved by the DOE.

c. Issue appropriate directions to the Respondent School that the excess fee charged over and above the approved fee for the previous academic years is to be refunded without any further delay in the light of the rejection order dated 22.05.2024 passed by the DOE, Delhi.

d. Issue appropriate directions to the Respondent School to immediately reinstate the children of the Petitioners.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the respondent no.3/DPS has struck off the names of the wards of the present petitioners on the ground that they have not paid the increased school fee. He submits that the said fee has been increased without the approval of the Directorate of Education (DOE).

5. In view of the above, issue notice. The learned Standing Counsel for the respondent nos. 1 and 2, as well as, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3 appearing on advance service accept notice.

6. Let the Reply/Counter-affidavit be filed within a period of three weeks. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed before the next date.

7. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no.3 controvert the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and submits that relief sought in the present petition, in fact, has already been sought by the present petitioners by filing another writ petition i.e, W.P. (C) 14473/2022, as well as, filing various miscellaneous applications. He submits that the outstanding fee of petitioners till May 2024 is as follows:-



- (i) Petitioner no.1 - Rs. 85,991/-
- (ii) Petitioner no.2 - Rs. 66,419/-
- (iii) Petitioner no.3 - Rs. 93,209/-

8. In the interregnum, it is directed that without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the respective parties and subject to the petitioners depositing the increased school fee only for the academic year 2024-25, the names of the children of the wards of the petitioners be restored on the rolls of the school. However, the question as regard the payment of increased school fee for the previous academic year will be considered by the Roster Bench.

9. List on 30.07.2024, before the Roster Bench.

**VIKAS MAHAJAN
(VACATION JUDGE)**

JUNE 7, 2024/dss



2024:DHC:3453



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ W.P.(C) 5743/2024 & CM APPL. 23712/2024, CM APPL. 23713/2024

**ACTION COMMITTEE UNAIDED RECOGNIZED
PRIVATE SCHOOLS**

..... Petitioner

Through: Mr. Kamal Gupta, Mrs. Tripti Gupta, Mr. Sparsh Aggarwal, Mr. Karan Chaudhary, Ms. Yosha Dutt, Mr. S.L. Bansal and Mr. Nikhil Kukreja, Advs.

versus

DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION

..... Respondent

Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, SC (Civil) for GNCTD/DoE with Ms. Prashansa Sharma and Mr. Rishabh Srivastava, Advs.

CORAM:**HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR****ORDER (ORAL)**% **29.04.2024****CM APPL. 23713/2024 (Exemption)**

1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application is disposed of.

W.P.(C) 5743/2024 & CM APPL. 23712/2024 (Stay)

3. The grievance of the petitioner in this case is directed against the following order dated 27 March 2024, passed by the Directorate of Education (DoE):

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“GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
OLD SECRETARIAT, CIVIL LINES, DELHI-110054
(PRIVATE SCHOOL BRANCH)

No.F.DE-15(40)/PSB/2019/1433-1440

DATED 27/03/24

ORDER

Whereas as per Section 17 of DSEAR, 1973, it is clear that no private unaided school in Delhi which has been allotted land by the Govt. Agencies shall enhance fee without the prior sanction of the Director of Education.

Now, therefore, all the Head of Schools/Managers of Private Recognized Unaided Schools, allotted land by the land owning agencies on the condition of seeking prior sanction of Director of Education for increase in fee, are directed to submit their proposals, if any, for prior sanction of the Director of Education for increase in tuition fee/fee for the academic session 2024-25, online from 01.04.2024 through website of Directorate and upload the returns and documents mentioned therein latest by 15.04.2024. Any incomplete proposal shall be summarily rejected.

The proposals submitted by the schools shall be scrutinized by the Director through any officer or teams authorized on this behalf. In case, no proposal is submitted by the school in terms of this order, the school shall not increase tuition fee/fee, Such schools are strictly directed not to increase any fee until the sanction is conveyed to their proposal by Director of Education. In case of any complaint regarding increase of any fee without such prior approval will be viewed seriously and will make the school liable for action against itself as per the statutory provisions.

The link of module for submitting the proposals online and uploading the returns and documents shall be uploaded soon on the website of the Directorate at the link school plant->fee structure->proposal for fee hike 2024-25 accessible through school login and password.

This issues with the prior approval of the Competent Authority.”

(DAVENDRA MOHAN)
Deputy Director of Education (PSB)”

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The decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, rival submissions in that regard, and analysis thereof

4. Mr. Kamal Gupta, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order is in the teeth of the judgment of this Court in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools v. DoE*¹ and *Mt. Carmel School v. DoE*² both of which were decided by a common judgment dated 15 March 2019, reported as **2019 SCC OnLine Del 7591**.

5. He has drawn my attention to paras 95, 96, 125, 132, 182, 184, 187, 196 and 207 of the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* which read thus:

“95. The emphasis, by the Supreme Court, in paragraph 27 of the *Modern School* judgment³, on compliance with the provisions of the DSE Act and the DSE Rules, makes it clear that the Supreme Court intended compliance, with its directions, to be in tandem with the provisions thereof, and not blind thereto. How, then, is that possible, if at all? The answer, quite obviously, is that, if the provisions of the DSE Act and/or the DSE Rules contain anything which harmonizes with paragraphs 16 and 17 of the terms of allotment of the land, those provisions have to be borne in mind while examining whether compliance, with the “land clause”, has, or has not, taken place.

96. The submission of Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that such harmonization is possible only if the requirement of “prior approval”, contemplated by Clause 16 of the terms of allotment of the land, is dovetailed into Section 17(3)⁴ of the DSE Act. Thus viewed, Mr. Gupta would

¹ WP (C) 4374/2018

² WP (C) 13546/2018

³ **Modern School v. U.O.I., (2004) 5 SCC 583**

⁴ (3) The manager of every recognised school shall, before the commencement of each academic session, file with the Director a full statement of the fees to be levied by such school during the ensuing academic

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submit, the directions issued by the Supreme Court required the schools to furnish their statement of fee, to the DoE, before the commencement of the academic session, and the DoE to examine the same and take a decision thereon before such commencement. The directions contained in **Modern School** (supra), Mr. Gupta would exhort us to hold, do not afford a *carte blanche* to the DoE to sit, as it were, over the statement of fees submitted by the schools, thereby preventing them from increasing their fees, and, as a result, trespassing on their right to establish and administer the schools, as guaranteed by Article 26(a) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Gupta would also emphasize, repeatedly, the position - which, he submits, is practically gilt-edged - that, so long as the schools do not charge capitation fee, and do not indulge in profiteering, their decision, qua the fees to be charged by them, cannot brook interference at the hands of any governmental authority, including the DoE.

125. **Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-II**⁵ (supra) is significant, as, for the first time, it signalled a breakaway from the **Pai**⁶-**Islamic Academy**⁷-**Inamdar**⁸-**Modern School** regime, in the case of the Order, dated 11 February, 2009 supra, even while otherwise reiterating the principles contained in the said decisions which may, justifiably, be regarded, by now, as fossilised in education jurisprudence. The following principles, as contained in the earlier decisions, of the Supreme Court, to which reference has already been made hereinabove, find iteration in **Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-II**:

- (i) Schools could not indulge in commercialisation of education. “Commercialisation of education” was equated, by this Court, to “indulging in profiteering”.
- (ii) For this purpose, the fee structures of schools had to remain within bounds.
- (iii) At the same time, a “reasonable surplus” was permissible, for development of the school and for the benefit of the students.

session, and except with the prior approval of the Director, no such school shall charge, during that academic session, any fee in excess of the fee specified by its manager in the said statement.

⁵ **Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh v. G.N.C.T.D.**, ILR (2011) 4 Del 247

⁶ **T. M. A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka**, (2002) 8 SCC 481.

⁷ **Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka**, (2003) 6 SCC 697

⁸ **P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra**, (2005) 6 SCC 537

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(iv) In the ultimate eventuate, a balance was required to be struck between the autonomy of the institution and the measures to be taken *in order to avoid commercialisation of education*.

(v) The first right, to fix the fee or increase the fee, was with the schools.

(vi) The DoE could step in and interfere, if the fee was found to be excessive and amounted to “indulging in profiteering”. This exercise would be relatable to Section 17(3) of the DSE Act.

(vii) The situation that arose, consequent to their requirement of compliance with the recommendations of the Pay Commission was, however, required to be “judged in a different hue altogether”. This was a pan-school phenomenon, covering all aided and unaided recognised schools in Delhi. Conflicting interests came into being, with the schools claiming that the additional burden, which had fallen on their shoulders, could be borne only if they were permitted to increase their fees, and the parents contending, on the other hand, that the financial health of the schools was robust enough to bear the burden, without fee increase - or, at least, without increase to the extent to which it had been effected. Examination of the merits of these rival contentions required going into the financial condition of each school, which would be a time consuming exercise. In such circumstances, it was permissible to allow an “interim fee hike”, as was done by the Order dated 11 February, 2009 supra, which would temporarily still the waters, with a cap on the upper limit of fees chargeable. The circumstances being exceptional, it could not be said that the order, allowing such interim fee hike, trespassed on the autonomy of the schools to fix their fees.

(viii) In the normal course, however, the position that, at the time of fixation of fees, by the school at the start of the academic session, no prior permission of the DoE was required, continued to operate. *Justice for All v. G.N.C.T.D.*⁹

132. Specifically in the matter of charging of fees, and the

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fixation and determination of the quantum thereof, all decisions, at least of the Supreme Court, have been uniform in asserting that maximum autonomy, to unaided educational institutions, whether minority or non -minority, was guaranteed by the Constitution, the only curbs, thereon, being in relation to commercialisation of education, i.e., profiteering and charging of capitation fee. So long as the fees charged by the concerned educational institution(s) did not amount to “commercialisation of education”, thus understood, the Constitution clearly advocates a “hands off” approach by the Government, insofar as the establishment and administration of the institution, including the fixation of fees by it, was concerned. This would also immunise the institution from the requirement of being called upon to explain its receipts and expenses, as before a Chartered Accountant.

182. There is no reference, in the said judgment, to Section 24, and Mr. Ramesh Singh does not dispute this fact. It is a well settled proposition of law that no more can be read into a judgment than is expressly stated therein. Equally well-settled is the ancillary proposition that the judgment is an authority only for what it states, and not for what may be read into the judgment by implication. (Refer: *Union of India v. Chajju Ram (dead) by LRs*¹⁰.)

184. I am of the opinion that the attempt, of Mr. Ramesh Singh, to trace the authority of the DoE, in the present case, to withdraw the recognition granted to the petitioner, to Section 24(4) of the DSE Act, is completely misguided. Section 24 constitutes a self-contained scheme, dealing with “Inspection of schools”. At the cost of reiteration, the said Section may be reproduced, thus:

“24. Inspection of schools.-

- (1) Every recognised school shall be inspected at least once in each financial year in such manner as may be prescribed.
- (2) The Director may also arrange special inspection of any school on such aspects of its working as may, from time to time, be considered necessary by him.



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(3) The Director may give directions to the manager to rectify any *defects or deficiency* found *at the time of inspection or otherwise* in the working of the school.

(4) *If the manager fails to comply with the direction given under sub -section (3),* the Director may, after considering the explanation or report, if any, given or made by the manager, take such action as he may think fit, including—

- (a) stoppage of aid,
- (b) withdrawal of recognition, or
- (c) except in the case of minority school taking over of the school under section 20.”

187. In the present case, however, it is not necessary for this Court to proceed to that stage as, in my view, sub-section (4) of Section 24 was totally inapplicable. The impugned Order of withdrawal of recognition does not purport to have been passed as a sequel to non-compliance, by the petitioner, which any directions issued under subsection (3) of the DSE Act, following upon an inspection of the School, in accordance with the scheme of Section 24.

196. The power to make rules conferred by Section 28 of the DSE Act. Sub-section (1) thereof empowers the Administrator to, with the previous approval of the Central Government, and by previous publication by notification, “make rules to carry out the provisions of the Act”. This, by itself, indicates that the DSE Rules cannot be so interpreted as to permit something which the DSE Act does not. I have already opined, hereinabove, that the withdrawal of recognition of the petitioner, by the DoE, and the manner in which the said withdrawal was effected, was not in accordance with any provision of the DSE Act, and could not be stated to be authorised thereby. The inevitable corollary would be that the said decision could not be authorised by any provisions of the DSE Rules, either, as, then, the Rules would be infracting Section 28(1) of the DSE Act and would, to that extent, be *ultra vires*.

207. Proceeding, now, to the merits of the impugned Order, i.e., to the validity of the objection, by the DoE, regarding non-

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obtaining, by the petitioner, of “prior approval” of the DoE, before enhancing its fees, it would become apparent, from a reading of the discussion hereinabove, and the law laid down by the various decisions cited in that regard, that, in the matter of fixation of fees, the distinction, between the rights of unaided non-minority schools, and unaided minority schools, is practically chimerical. In both cases, the schools are entitled to complete autonomy in the matter of fixation of their fees and management of their accounts, subject only to the condition that they do not indulge in profiteering, and do not charge capitation fee, thereby “commercialising” education. There is no requirement for the school to take “prior approval”, of the DoE, before enhancing its fees. The only responsibility, on the School, is to submit its statement of fee, as required by Section 17(3) of the DSE Act. Mr. Gupta is right in his submission that, having done so, the schools could not be expected to wait *ad infinitum*, before the said statement of fees, submitted by them, was examined and verified by the DoE. Any such examination and verification, too, it is clarified, would have to be limited to the issue of whether, by fixing its fees, or enhancing the same, the school was “commercialising” education, either by charging capitation fee or by indulging in profiteering. If, therefore, pending the decision of the DoE on its Statement of Fee, the school decided to commence charging the enhanced fee from the beginning of the next academic session, it cannot be said that the school had, in any manner, infringed the provisions of the DSE Act or the DSE Rules.”

(Underscoring supplied)

6. Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel for DoE, relies, on the other hand, on paras 139 and 140 of the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, which read thus:

“139. The “land clause” read thus:

“The school shall not increase the rates of tuition fee without the prior sanction of the Directorate of Education, Delhi Administration...”

140. The afore-extracted clause, quite clearly, operates as a proscription on the school(s). Schools, the allotment documents in respect where of contained this clause were, by operation thereof, not permitted to increase the rates of tuition fee without the prior



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sanction of the DoE. Even for this simple reason, the entire argument, of Mr. Ramesh Singh, that the issuance of the impugned Order, dated 13 April, 2018, was necessitated as the provision for “interim fee hike”, as contained in the Order dated 17 October, 2017, infringed the “land clause”, has necessarily to fail. The “interim fee hike”, permitted by the Order dated 17 October, 2017, was a dispensation by the DoE itself, which had the imprimatur of the ***Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-II decision***. It was not an act of increase of fees by the schools. The “land clause”, as contained in the allotment documents of the DDA, did not, at any point of time, inhibit the DoE from allowing an interim fee hike.”

7. Predicated on the opening sentences in para 140 of ***Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools***, Mr. Tripathi sought to contend that this Court has accorded its imprimatur to the principle that schools which are situated on land, to which the land clause applies, could not increase their fees without prior approval.

8. The primary challenge in ***Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*** was against the withdrawal, by the DoE, of a Circular dated 17 October 2017, by which unaided private schools were permitted an interim fee hike to cater to the additional expense which they had to incur consequent on the recommendations of the VII Central Pay Commission, which required them to increase the salaries of their teachers and staff. The said circular was withdrawn by the DoE on 13 April 2018, to the extent it applied to schools which were situated on land provided to the schools at concessional rates by public bodies, including a clause, in the lease deed, requiring the school to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fees. As such, the issue of whether a school covered by the “land clause” was required to take prior approval before increasing its fees was directly

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in issue in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*.

9. The challenges in the writ petition filed by the Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools (“Action Committee” hereinafter) and Mt. Carmel School (“Mt Carmel” hereinafter) were slightly different on facts.

10. Action Committee challenged the circular dated 13 April 2018 itself, contending that the liability of an unaided recognised school under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (“the DSE Act”) and the Delhi School Education Rules 1973 (“the DSE Rules”), was only to submit its statement of fee before every financial year under Section 17(3). There was no proscription, in the statute, preventing it from increasing fees without prior approval of the DoE.

11. Mt Carmel, on the other hand, actually increased its fees without the prior approval of the DoE, following which the DoE took action against the school seeking to de-recognise it. Said decision was challenged by Mt Carmel in its writ petition, which also came to be decided by the same judgment.

12. Mr. Gupta is correct in his submission that the running thread, in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, is that an unaided recognized school is *not required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fees, irrespective of whether it is situated on land to which the “land clause” does, or does not, apply.*



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13. Mr. Tripathi's reading of para 140 of *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* is flawed. Para 140 only observes that the submission of Mr. Ramesh Singh, who appeared for the DoE in that case, that the withdrawal, of the 17 October 2017 circular by the DoE, by the circular dated 13 April 2018 in the case of "land clause" schools was justified by the land clause itself, was incorrect. This Bench held, dealing with the said argument, that the land clause could not be pressed into service by the DoE to justify the withdrawal of the 17 October 2017 circular by the 13 April 2018 circular, as the land clause only applied to rights of school to increase fees without prior sanction of the DoE, whereas the interim fee hike granted by the circular dated 17 October 2017 was a hike which was *suo motu* granted by the DoE. The withdrawal of the said interim fee hike could not, therefore, be sought to be justified on the basis of the land clause, which had nothing to do with it.

14. Quite clearly, therefore, para 140 of the judgment in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* does not accord any judicial imprimatur to the land clause, or to the principle, so assiduously canvassed by Mr. Tripathi that schools which were situated on land to which land clause applies, cannot possibly increase their fees without prior approval of the DoE.

15. The decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* rules precisely to the contrary.

16. I may observe, here, that the decision in *Action Committee*



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Unaided Recognized Private Schools was taken by this Bench after going through the entire gamut of case law on the subject, including *Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh v. U.O.I.*¹¹, *Modern School v. U.O.I.*¹², *Justice for All v. G.N.C.T.D.*¹³, *Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka*¹⁴, *P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra*¹⁵, *T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka*¹⁶ and *Abhibhavak Mahasangh v. G.N.C.T.D.*¹⁷.

17. Mr. Tripathi requests the Court to note the fact that, in answer to the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Modern School*. According to him, *Modern School* specifically holds that schools which are subject to the “land clause” have to take prior approval of the DoE before enhancing their fees.

18. This amounts to an attempt to re-argue what was argued, *ad nauseam*, in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, and discussed at length. Apropos the judgment of the Supreme Court in *Modern School*, the following passages from *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* are relevant:

“*Modern School v. U.O.I.*, (2004) 5 SCC 583, rendered by a bench of 3 Hon'ble Judges on 27th April, 2004

¹¹ AIR 1999 Del 124

¹² (2004) 5 SCC 583

¹³ (2016) 227 DLT 354 (DB)

¹⁴ (2003) 6 SCC 697

¹⁵ (2005) 6 SCC 537

¹⁶ (2002) 8 SCC 481

¹⁷ ILR (2011) 4 Del 247

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76. This judgment, or, more particularly, paragraph 27 thereof, constitutes the sheet-anchor to employ a time-worn cliché of the respondents' case.

77. *Modern School (supra)*, as already noted hereinabove, was an appeal from *Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-I (supra)*.

78. The constitution of the bench which decided *Modern School (supra)* is significant, constituting, as it did, of V.N. Khare, the Hon'ble Chief Justice, S. B. Sinha, J. and S. H. Kapadia, J. (as he then was). The judgment was authored by Kapadia, J., for himself and Khare, C. J., with Sinha, J., penning a dissent. This is significant because Khare, C. J., was also part of the bench which decided *T.M.A. Pai (supra)* and *Islamic Academy of Education (supra)* and was, in fact, the author of the majority judgment in *Islamic Academy (supra)*. It would be reasonable, therefore, to presume that *Modern School (supra)* could not be interpreted as breaking away from the legal position as enunciated in *T.M.A. Pai (supra)* and *Islamic Academy (supra)*. The attempt has, at all times, therefore, to be to harmonize these decisions, and read them as a cohesive whole, representing the law on the issue.

79. The Supreme Court, in this case, framed the following questions, as arising for its consideration:

“(1) Whether the Director of Education has the authority to regulate the quantum of fees charged by unaided schools under Section 17(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973?

(2) Whether the direction issued on 15-12-1999 by the Director of Education under Section 24(3) of the Act stating *inter alia* that no fees/funds collected from parents/students shall be transferred from the Recognised Unaided School Fund to the society or trust or any other institution, is in conflict with Rule 177 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (“The Rules”)?

(3) Whether managements of recognised unaided schools are entitled to set up a Development Fund Account under the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973?”

80. Of these, only Issue (a) concerns the present controversy.



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81. The Supreme Court distilled the judgment of this Court in *Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-I (supra)* thus (in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the report):

“7. Delhi Abibhavak Mahasangh, a federation of parents' association moved the Delhi High Court by Writ Petition No. 3723 of 1997 challenging the fee hike in various schools in Delhi. It was a public interest writ petition filed on 8-9-1997 impleading thirty unaided recognised public schools. The grievance of the Mahasangh was that recognised private unaided schools in Delhi are indulging in large-scale commercialisation of education which was against public interest. That commercialisation has reached an alarming situation on account of failure of the Government to perform its statutory functions under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as “the Act”). One of the serious charges in the writ petition against the said unaided recognised schools was transfer of funds by the said schools to the society/trust and/or to other schools run by the same society/trust. In this connection, it was alleged that there was excess of income over expenditure under the head “Tuition fee” and further interest-free loans of huge amount have been taken from parents for giving admissions to the children. It was also alleged that huge amounts collected remained unspent under the head “Building fund”. On the other hand, before the High Court, it was submitted on behalf of the schools that the above increase in fees, annual charges, admission fees and security deposit was justified on account of increase in the expenses and in particular, salaries of teachers in compliance with recommendations of the Fifth Pay Commission.

8. The key issue before the High Court, therefore, was whether unaided recognised schools were indulging in commercialisation of education. The High Court found from the reports submitted by the inspection teams appointed by the Government that there were irregularities in the management of the accounts. Therefore, by the impugned judgment, directions were given regarding utilisation of tuition fees for payment of salaries of teachers and employees and also for utilisation of the surplus under the specific head of tuition fees. By the impugned judgment, the High Court declared that the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder prohibited transfer of funds from the schools to the society/trust or to other schools run by the same society/trust. By the impugned judgment, the

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High Court appointed a committee headed by Ms. Justice Santosh Duggal (hereinafter referred to as “the Duggal Committee”) to examine the economics of each of the recognised unaided schools in Delhi. Being aggrieved, the unaided recognised schools and the Action Committee of Unaided Private Schools have come by way of appeal to this Court. During the pendency of the civil appeals, the Duggal Committee submitted its report which has been accepted by the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Directorate of Education), consequent upon which the Director of Education has issued directions to the Managing Committees of all recognised unaided schools in Delhi under Section 24(3) read with Sections 18(4) and (5) of the Act, which directions are the subject-matter of the civil appeals herein.”

82. The dispute which engaged this Court in *Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh* (supra) – and, consequently, the Supreme Court in *Modern School* (supra) – was whether schools were indulging in “commercialisation of education” by charging fees which were excessive and disproportionate in comparison to their requirement, and whether, therefore, the DoE had acted within, or in excess of, the jurisdiction vested in it, by issuing directives to control the same.

83. The appellant, before the Supreme Court, is a well known private unaided recognized school. It sought to fault the judgment, of this Court in *Delhi Abhibhavak Mahasangh-I* (supra), and the contention advanced, in this regard, stands precisely distilled, in paragraph 12 of the report, thus:

“It was urged on behalf of the management that in the impugned judgment the High Court had erred in holding that tuition fees should be ordinarily utilised for payment of salaries and if incidental surplus remained, it could be used for other educational purposes but that would not empower the management to levy higher tuition fees. It was submitted on behalf of the management that the Government has no authority to regulate the fees payable by the students of unaided schools as indicated by Section 17(3) of the Act which required the management only to submit to the Director a full statement of fees leviable during the ensuing academic session. In this connection, Section 17(3) was contrasted with Section 17(1) and Section 17(2) of the Act, which empower the Government to regulate the fees payable by the students of aided schools.”

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84. “The first point for determination”, says the judgment in paragraph 13, “is whether the Director of Education has the authority to regulate the fees of unaided schools”. Having thus got, straightaway as it were, to the meat of the matter, the judgment proceeds, in paragraph 14, to hold thus:

“At the outset, before analysing the provisions of the 1973 Act, we may state that it is now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that *in the matter of determination of the fee structure unaided educational institutions exercise a great autonomy as they, like any other citizen carrying on an occupation, are entitled to a reasonable surplus for development of education and expansion of the institution. Such institutions, it has been held, have to plan their investment and expenditure so as to generate profit. What is, however, prohibited is commercialisation of education.* Hence, we have to strike a balance between autonomy of such institutions and measures to be taken to prevent commercialisation of education. However, in none of the earlier cases, this Court has defined the concept of reasonable surplus, profit, income and yield, which are the terms used in the various provisions of the 1973 Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

85. The emphasis, in these opening words of the Supreme Court, on “commercialisation of education”, is of paramount significance. The balance that is required to be struck - as postulated in the above-extracted passage - is *not* between the autonomy of the institutions and *the power of the DoE to regulate*, but between the autonomy of the institutions and *measures to be taken to prevent commercialization of education*. In so holding, **Modern School (supra)** reiterates what **T.M.A. Pai (supra)** so painstakingly clarified - viz., that the regulatory power of the DoE was to be directed at *preventing commercialization of education*. It was not, therefore, a regulatory power to be exercised in such a manner as to take over the autonomy of the schools in the matter of fixation of their fees, or even appropriation of their financial resources. Paragraph 15 of the report, in fact, goes on to note that, in **T.M.A. Pai (supra)**, the Supreme Court “observed ... that the right to establish and administer an institution included the right to admit students; *right to set up a reasonable fee structure*; right to constitute a governing body, right to appoint staff and right to take disciplinary action.”

86. What falls for consideration is, therefore, the extent to which, given the right of the unaided educational institution to “set up a reasonable fee structure”, and, for the said purpose, to fix its



fees, the DoE could exercise its regulatory jurisdiction, and the point at which the exercise of such jurisdiction overstepped its legitimate boundaries and transgressed into the domain of the discretion vested in the institution.

87. In this context, paragraph 15 of the report goes on to note thus:

“However, the right to establish an institution under Article 19(1)(g) is subject to reasonable restriction in terms of clause (6) thereof. Similarly, the right conferred on minorities, religious or linguistic, to establish and administer educational institution of their own choice under Article 30(1) is held to be subject to reasonable regulations which *inter alia* may be framed having regard to public interest and national interest. In the said judgment, it was observed (vide paragraph 56) that economic forces have a role to play in the matter of fee fixation. The institutions should be permitted to make reasonable profits after providing for investment and expenditure. However, capitation fee and profiteering were held to be forbidden. Subject to the above two prohibitory parameters, this Court in ***T.M.A. Pai Foundation case*** held that fees to be charged by the unaided educational institutions cannot be regulated. Therefore, *the issue before us is as to what constitutes reasonable surplus in the context of the provisions of the 1973 Act.*”

(Emphasis supplied)

88. The above extracted passage clarifies two important aspects, which have necessarily to be borne in mind while appreciating the judgment in ***Modern School (supra)***, viz. that (i) the position, in law, emanating from ***T.M.A. Pai (supra)***, that private unaided educational institutions should be permitted reasonable profits after providing for investment and expenditure, subject to a proscription against charging of capitation fee and profiteering, was noted and, needless to say, approved, and (ii) the issue, with which the Supreme Court engaged itself, was “as to what constitutes reasonable surplus”, in the context of the DSE Act.

89. Proceeding, thereafter, to deal with the judgment in ***Islamic Academy (supra)*** in the light of the provisions of the DSE Act and the DSE Rules, the Supreme Court held, in paragraph 17 of the report, thus:

“Therefore, reading Section 18(4) with Rules 172, 173, 174, 175 and 177 on one hand and Section 17(3) on the



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other hand, it is clear that *under the Act, the Director is authorised to regulate the fees and other charges to prevent commercialisation of education*. Under Section 17(3), the school has to furnish a full statement of fees in advance before the commencement of the academic session. Reading Section 17(3) with Sections 18(3) and (4) of the Act and the Rules quoted above, it is clear that the Director has the authority to regulate the fees under Section 17(3) of the Act.”

(Emphasis supplied)

90. Here, again, the Supreme Court is at pains to emphasize that the authority of the DoE, to regulate fees and other charges, is “to prevent commercialisation of education”. “Commercialisation of education”, and the necessity of preventing it at all costs, *for which* regulatory power vests in the DoE, therefore, runs as the constant undercurrent behind the surface of the DSE Act and the DSE Rules, and the rights and powers conferred on various entities thereby and thereunder. It is also significant that the Supreme Court localizes this regulatory power and authority, of the DoE, to Section 17(3) of the DSE Act. The parameters and peripheries of Section 17(3) must, therefore, necessarily inform any examination of the balance of powers conferred by the said provision.

91. Paragraphs 18 to 26 of the report, thereafter, go on to discuss the second and third issues framed by the Supreme Court, as extracted hereinabove. Inasmuch as these issues do not concern the controversy in the present petition, these paragraphs need not detain us.

92. Then follows the “Conclusion”, as set out in paragraph 27 of the judgment, which constitutes the essential basis of the submissions of Mr. Ramesh Singh, and would, as he would seek to contend, provide sublime justification for all subsequent actions of the DoE, including the issuance of the impugned order dated 13th April, 2018. The said paragraph reads thus:

“27. In addition to the directions given by the Director of Education vide Order No. DE.15/Act/Duggal. Com/203/99/23989-24938 dated 15-12-1999, we give further directions as mentioned hereinbelow:

(a) Every recognised unaided school covered by the Act shall maintain the accounts on the principles of accounting applicable to non-business organisation/not-for-profit organisation.

In this connection, we *inter alia* direct every such school to prepare their financial statement

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consisting of the balance sheet, profit-and-loss account, and receipt-and-payment account.

(b) Every school is required to file a statement of fees every year before the ensuing academic session under Section 17(3) of the said Act with the Director. Such statement will indicate estimated income of the school derived from fees, estimated current operational expenses towards salaries and allowances payable to employees in terms of Rule 177(1). Such estimate will also indicate provision for donation, gratuity, reserve fund and other items under Rule 177(2) and savings thereafter, if any, in terms of the proviso to Rule 177(1).

(c) *It shall be the duty of the Director of Education to ascertain whether terms of allotment of land by the Government to the schools have been complied with.* We are shown a sample letter of allotment issued by the Delhi Development Authority issued to some of the schools which are recognised unaided schools. We reproduce herein clauses 16 and 17 of the sample letter of allotment:

“16. The school shall not increase the rates of tuition fee without the prior sanction of the Directorate of Education, Delhi Administration and shall follow the provisions of the Delhi School Education Act/Rules, 1973 and other instructions issued from time to time.

17. The Delhi Public School Society shall ensure that percentage of freeship from the tuition fee, as laid down under the rules by the Delhi Administration, is from time to time strictly complied with. They will ensure admission to the student belonging to weaker sections to the extent of 25% and grant freeship to them.”

28. *We are directing the Director of Education to look into letters of allotment issued by the Government and ascertain whether they have been complied with by the schools.* This exercise shall be complied with within a period of three months from the date of communication of this judgment to the Director of Education. *If in a given*

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case, the Director finds non-compliance with the above terms, the Director shall take appropriate steps in this regard.”

(Emphasis supplied)

93. The above extracted paragraphs 27 and 28 of the report direct the DoE to *ascertain whether the terms of allotment of land by the Government to the schools have been complied with*, and to *look into the letters of allotment* for the said purpose. Among the conditions of allotment, as extracted verbatim by the Supreme Court, is the proscription on increasing the rates of tuition fee without the *prior sanction* of the DoE.

94. A holistic and conjoint reading of the above directions, with the earlier decision in *T.M.A. Pai (supra)*, would make it clear that the Supreme Court could not have intended the implementation of its directions to have been undertaken either *de hors* the provisions of the DSE Act and the DSE Rules, or in the teeth of the *Pai* pronouncement. *T.M.A. Pai (supra)* conferred complete autonomy, on private unaided schools, in the matter of fixation of their fees. The only limitation - if one may call it that - to the sweep of this right is in the stipulation that the fees fixed should not be in the form of capitation, or amount to profiteering. Absent these interdictions, it is clearly not open to the DoE to entrench on the territory of the schools, insofar as the matter of fixation of their fees is concerned.

95. The emphasis, by the Supreme Court, in paragraph 27 of the *Modern School* judgment, on compliance with the provisions of the DSE Act and the DSE Rules, makes it clear that the Supreme Court intended compliance, with its directions, to be in tandem with the provisions thereof, and not blind thereto. How, then, is that possible, if at all? The answer, quite obviously, is that, if the provisions of the DSE Act and/or the DSE Rules contain anything which harmonizes with paragraphs 16 and 17 of the terms of allotment of the land, those provisions have to be borne in mind while examining whether compliance, with the “land clause”, has, or has not, taken place.

96. The submission of Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, is that such harmonization is possible only if the requirement of “prior approval”, contemplated by Clause 16 of the terms of allotment of the land, is dovetailed into Section 17(3) of the DSE Act. Thus viewed, Mr. Gupta would submit, the directions issued by the Supreme Court required the schools to furnish their statement of fee, to the DoE, before the commencement of the academic session, and the DoE to examine

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the same and take a decision thereon *before* such commencement. The directions contained in *Modern School* (supra), Mr. Gupta would exhort us to hold, do not afford a *carte blanche* to the DoE to sit, as it were, over the statement of fees submitted by the schools, thereby preventing them from increasing their fees, and, as a result, trespassing on their right to establish and administer the schools, as guaranteed by Article 26(a) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Gupta would also emphasize, repeatedly, the position - which, he submits, is practically gilt-edged - that, so long as the schools do not charge capitation fee, and do not indulge in profiteering, their decision, qua the fees to be charged by them, cannot brook interference at the hands of any governmental authority, including the DoE.

The takeaway from *Modern School* (supra)

97. From *Modern School* (supra), the following propositions emerge:

(i) The issue for consideration, before the Supreme Court, was whether schools were indulging in “commercialisation of education”, by charging excessive and disproportionate fees and whether, therefore, the DoE had acted within its jurisdiction in issuing directives to control the same.

(ii) Unaided educational institutions enjoyed greater autonomy, in the matter of determination fee structure, and were also entitled to a reasonable surplus for development of education and expansion of the institution. Such institutions are to be allowed to plan their investment and expenditure, so as to generate profit. Reasonable profit, after providing for investment and expenditure, was permissible.

(iii) In the garb thereof, however, these institutions could not be permitted to engage or indulge in “commercialisation of education”. Charging of capitation fees, and profiteering, could not be allowed. The Government was, therefore, justified in taking measures to prevent this malady.

(iv) A balance, therefore, was required to be struck between autonomy of the institutions and measures to be taken to prevent commercialisation of education. The prevalent undercurrent of the discussion and conclusion, in *Modern School* (supra) was, therefore, that

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“commercialisation of education” had, at all costs, to be prevented. It is this “commercialisation of education” which, according to the Supreme Court, had to be curbed, and for the curbing whereof, regulatory measures could legitimately be put in place by the Government. These regulatory measures have, however, to operate, and be operated, within the parameters and peripheries of Section 17(3) of the DSE Act.

(v) These regulatory measures could not, however, be permitted to trespass on the autonomy of the unaided educational institutions, or take it over, in the matter of fixation of fees, or even appropriation of financial resources. The right to set up a reasonable fee structure, therefore, transcendently remained with the unaided educational institution concerned.

(vi) The right to establish and administer minority educational institutions, while independently conferred, on such institutions, by Article 30(1) of the Constitution, was subject to reasonable regulations, in public and national interest.

(vii) Subject to the prohibitory parameters, regarding charging of capitation fee and profiteering, fees chargeable by unaided educational institutions could not be regulated.

(viii) The “issue before it”, as encapsulated by the Supreme Court, was “as to what constitutes reasonable surplus in the context of the provisions of the 1973 Act”.

(ix) Among the directions, issued to the DoE at the conclusion of the judgment, was the direction to “ascertain whether terms of allotment of land by the Government to the schools have been complied with, by the schools”. In the event of non-compliance being detected, the DoE was directed to take “appropriate steps in that regard”.

These findings completely answer the reliance, placed by Mr. Tripathi, on *Modern School*.

Order of Division Bench in LPA in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*

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19. The decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* was carried in appeal to the Division Bench in LPA 230/2019 (*Directorate of Education v. Action Committee Unaided Recognised Private Schools*).

20. On 3 April 2019, notice was issued by the Division Bench on the said LPA. The only interim order which was passed was that land clause schools would not collect the amount constituting interim fee hike in terms of the 17 October 2017 order issued by the DoE.

21. *There was, therefore, no interference, interlocutory or otherwise, with the decision, in the judgment in Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools that, before hiking fees, unaided recognised school is not required to obtain prior approval of the DoE.*

Circular dated 27 March 2019 and decision in WP (C) 4897/2019

22. Mr. Gupta also points out that, on 27 March 2019, an identical circular had been issued by the DoE, which was challenged by Action Committee before this Court by way of WP (C) 4897/2019 in which, in para 6, the DoE made a specific statement to the effect that the said Circular would not apply to schools who have filed statement of fees within the prescribed period in terms of Section 17(3) of the Act for the Academic Session 2018-2019 and 2019-2020 whether offline or online.

23. The circular dated 27 March 2019 and the order dated 9 May

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2019 may be reproduced thus:

Circular dated 27 March 2019

“GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CAPITAL OF TERRITORY
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
OLD SECRETARIAT, CIVIL LINES, DELHI-110054
(PRIVATE SCHOOL BRANCH)

No.F.DE-15(40)/PS8/2019/2698-2707

Dated: 27/03/2019

ORDER

Whereas Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide judgment dated 19.01.2016 in the writ Petition No 4109/2013 in the matter of "Justice for All versus GNCTD and others" has directed the Director of Education to ensure the compliance of the terms, if any, in the letter of allotment regarding the increase of the fee by all the Private Recognized Unaided Schools which are allotted land by DDA/Other land owning agencies.

Now, therefore, all the Head of Schools/Managers of Private Recognized Unaided Schools, allotted land by the land owning agencies on the condition of seeking prior sanction of Director of Education for increase in fee, are directed to submit their proposals, if any, for prior sanction of the Director of Education for increase in tuition fee/fee for the academic session 2018-19 and 2019-20 (through the separate link on the online module), online from 30.03.2019 through website of Directorate and upload the returns and documents mentioned therein latest by 30.04.2019. Any incomplete proposal shall be summarily rejected.

Further, the schools are directed to submit complete set of documents/financial records as well as subsequent clarifications timely, in one go, so that the fee hike proposals of the schools can be disposed in time bound manner.

The proposals submitted by the schools shall be scrutinized by the Director of Education through any officer or teams authorized in this behalf. In case, no proposal is submitted by the school in terms of this order, the school shall not increase the tuition fee. All Such schools are strictly directed not to increase any fee until the sanction is conveyed to their proposal by Director of Education. Any complaint regarding increase of any fee without such prior approval will be viewed seriously and will make the school liable for action as per the statutory provisions and

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directions of Hon'ble Court.

The link of module for submitting the proposals online and uploading the returns and documents shall be uploaded soon on the website of the Directorate at the link school plant->Proposal for fee hike for DDA Land Schools, through school login and password.

This issues with prior approval of the Competent Authority.

(Yogesh Pratap)
Deputy Director of Education
Private School Branch"

Order dated 9 May 2019

“W.P.(C) 4897/2019

3. This writ petition is directed against the orders dated 15th February, 2019 and 27th March, 2019, which have been issued by the Directorate of Education (DOE).

4. Mr. Sunil Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner had concluded his submissions. *Mr. Ramesh Singh in response, submits that the impugned orders are intended to apply only to those schools who have not filed their statement of fees for the academic session 2018-19 and 2019-20, even offline till date.*

5. The petitioners in this case submits that they have filed their statement of fees in accordance with Section 17(3) of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, within the period prescribed therefor.

6. In this view of the matter, it is not necessary for any interim orders to be passed at this point of time, in view of the statement made by Mr. Ramesh Singh, to the effect that the impugned orders dated 15th February, 2019 and 27th March, 2019 would not apply to schools who have filed their statement of fees, within the prescribed period, in terms of Section 17(3) of the Act for the academic session 2018-19 and 2019-20 whether offline or online.

7. Accordingly, let notice issue to the respondents on the writ petition as well as the application for interim directions.

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8. Mr. Santosh Kr. Tripathi accepts notice on behalf of the respondent.

9. Counter affidavit be filed by the respondent within four weeks with advance copies to the petitioner who may file rejoinder thereto, if any, within two weeks thereof.

10. Renotify on 9th July, 2019.”

(Emphasis supplied)

24. The reliance, by Mr. Gupta, on the above order dated 9 May 2019 is also, *prima facie*, well placed. The DoE cannot be permitted to adopt contrasting stances in similar cases. Having conceded, in WP (C) 4897/2019, that the operation of the Circular 27 March 2019 – which is identical to the impugned Circular – would not apply to schools which had filed their statement of fees within the period prescribed in Section 17(3), it is difficult to understand how they could have issued the impugned Circular dated 27 March 2024 at all, much less sought to defend it in these proceedings.

Yashvir Singh Chauhan and order passed therein

25. Mr. Gupta also places reliance on order dated 7 September 2020 passed by a coordinate Bench in ***Master Yashvir Singh Chauhan v. Bal Bharti Public School***¹⁸. It was sought to be contended by the petitioners in that case, who were students, that the respondent-school had been increasing its fees every year without prior approval of the DoE, which was mandatory.

26. The Coordinate Bench has placed reliance, in para 7 of the

¹⁸ Order dated 7 September 2020 in WP (C) 6053/2020



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order, on the judgment of this Bench in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, specifically on para 207 thereof (which, in the copy of the judgment as uploaded on the website of this Court, was numbered as “para 192”)

27. Para 8 of the order in *Master Yashvir Singh Chauhan*, after quoting the aforesaid para, observed that, in the said paragraph, the responsibility of respondent school was to file an appropriate application for fee enhancement prior to the academic year and further observed that if the GNCTD was unable to deal with the said application for some reason, the school was free to increase its fees. The principle that no requirement of prior approval was required before an unaided recognised increased its fee was, therefore, impliedly recognised by the interim order in *Master Yashvir Singh Chauhan* as well.

28. The aforesaid interim order dated 7 September 2020 in *Master Yashvir Singh Chauhan* was carried in appeal to the Division Bench by way of LPA 260/2020, which was also dismissed by order dated 21 September 2020.

Extant legal position

29. The resultant legal position, as it exists today, following *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, is that an unaided recognized private school is not required to take prior approval of the DoE before increasing its fees, irrespective of whether the land clause

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does, or does not, apply to it.

30. I am constrained, at this stage, to enter a somewhat unhappy comment.

31. Respect for judicial pronouncements is one of the pillars of the edifice of the rule of law. The principle that private unaided schools do not have to seek prior approval before enhancing their fees, so long as they do not indulge in profiteering or commercialization of education by charging capitation fees, as well as the proposition that there is a distinction between “commercialization of education” and making of profits, as enunciated in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, remains undisturbed till date, though the decision is under challenge before the Division Bench. The only interim direction that has been passed, in order dated 3 April 2019 of the Division Bench in LPA 230/2019 (*DOE v. Action Committee Unaided Recognised Public Schools*) is against collection, by the school, of the interim fee hike as allowed by the DoE Circular dated 17 October 2017. On the prayer for stay of the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*, the Division Bench, in its order dated 8 April 2019 in LPA 230/2019, has observed that the matter would need detailed consideration, and proceeded to fix a series of dates for hearing the issue. That hearing, however, has not taken place, and no interim stay of the operation of the judgement in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* has, therefore, been granted.

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32. The DoE, howsoever, dissatisfied it may be with the judgment of this Court in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* has to respect it, so long as it stands. The attitude of the DoE in continuously issuing Circulars threatening recognized unaided schools with action in the event of their increasing their fees without obtaining prior approval of the DoE is objectionable, and cannot be allowed.

33. Nor can the DoE issue such Circulars, in the teeth of the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* and, when they are challenged, seek to re-argue the points which were canvassed and considered in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*. Schools cannot be driven to litigation thus. The grievances against the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* have, if at all, to be ventilated before the Division Bench before which the appeal is pending. So long as there is no interdiction, interlocutory or otherwise, by the Division Bench, with the principle in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* that no prior approval of the DoE is required before an unaided recognised school increases in its fees, even if situated on land to which “land clause” applies, it is the decision in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools* that would apply, and the DoE is required to respect that position.

34. There can be no gainsaying the fact that the impugned order is directly contrary to the law laid down in *Action Committee Unaided Recognized Private Schools*.

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35. In that view of the matter, issue notice on the writ petition to show cause as to why rule *nisi* be not issued as well as issue notice on the application for interim relief.

36. Notice is accepted on behalf of respondent by Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, learned Standing Counsel.

37. Counter-affidavit, if any, be filed within four weeks with an advance copy to learned counsel for the petitioner who may file rejoinder thereto within four weeks thereof.

38. Till the next date of hearing, the operation of the impugned circular dated 27 March 2024 issued by the DoE shall stand stayed.

39. Re-notify on 31 July 2024.

C.HARI SHANKAR, J

APRIL 29, 2024

dsn

[Click here to check corrigendum, if any](#)

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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ **W.P.(C) 14473/2022**
DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS Petitioners

Through: Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Cheryl
D'Souza & Ms. Neha Panchpal,
Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS. Respondents

Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi,
Standing Counsel (GNCTD) with Mr.
Arun Panwar, Mr. Pradeep & Mr.
Pradyumn Rao, Advocates for
GNCTD/R-1.
Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Rupendra Pratap Singh, Ms.
Sakshi Mendiratta & Mr. Mohit
Chandrash, Advocates for R-3/ DPS,
Dwarka.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER
% **12.10.2022**

CM APPL. 44192/2022 (for permission to file lengthy synopsis and list of dates)

1. Exemption allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.

CM APPL. 44191/2022 (for ad-interim stay)

3. Issue notice. Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, Standing Counsel



(GNCTD) appearing for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Rupendra Pratap Singh, counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3, accept notice.

4. Let reply be filed within a period of two days from today. Rejoinder thereto, be filed within two days thereafter.

5. Upon filing of process, issue notice to Respondent No. 2, by all permissible modes, returnable on the next date of hearing.

6. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, counsel for Petitioners, expresses urgency stating that Respondent No. 3 [DPS Dwarka – hereinafter “*School*”] has struck off the names of students/ wards of Petitioners from the rolls of the School. Further, he states that the School is also taking other coercive measures against the students/ wards of Petitioners, on account of non-payment of the hiked fee.

7. Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Counsel for the School, on instructions, clarifies that out of 52 wards of Petitioners before this Court – names of only 7 students have been struck off as of today, and in relation to others, no such action has been taken, as they have paid or are in the process of paying the fee.

8. Considering that the matter is listed on a short date, till the next date of hearing, as an *ad-interim* measure, no coercive action shall be taken by the School subject to Petitioners depositing 50% of the demanded fee, before the next date of hearing.

9. It is clarified that the above directions are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties and subject to further orders passed on the interim application.

10. In the meantime, counsel for parties are directed to file a brief note of submissions, not exceeding two pages, along with case law(s), if any, before



the next date of hearing.

11. List on 20th October, 2022.

W.P.(C) 14473/2022

12. Issue notice. Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, Standing Counsel (GNCTD) appearing for Respondent No. 1 and Mr. Rupendra Pratap Singh, counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3, accept notice.

13. Let counter affidavit be filed within four weeks from today. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed two weeks thereafter.

14. Upon filing of process, issue notice to Respondent No. 2, by all permissible modes, returnable on the next date of hearing.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

OCTOBER 12, 2022/ns

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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 14473/2022**

DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS.

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Ms. Cheryl D'souza and Ms. Neha Panchpal, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.

..... Respondents

Through: Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta and Mr. Siddharth Saxena, Advocates for R-School.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA

ORDER

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18.11.2022

CM APPL. 47714/2022 (u/ Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking impleadment)

1. Applicants who seek to join the present proceedings are also parents of students of Respondent No. 3 [DPS, Dwarka – hereinafter “School”]. Thus, the Court finds no ground to deny the request made in the application.
2. The application is allowed and stands disposed of.
3. Amended memo of parties, annexed along with the application, is taken on record.

CM APPL. 49589/2022 (u/ Sec. 151 of CPC on behalf of Petitioner seeking direction)

4. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, counsel for Petitioners, states that

understanding of the School, as borne out from e-mail dated 13th November, 2022, to the effect that interim order dated 12th October, 2022 (passed in CM APPL. 44191/2022 seeking *ad-interim* stay) – “*was only for 7 students and not for all petitioners (kindly refer to Point Nos. 7 & 8 in the Hon’ble High Court Order)*”, is *ex-facie* incorrect. He urges that the interim order referred to is clear and unambiguous, and applies to all Petitioners. Further, Mr. Bhushan states that by misconstruing the above order, School has struck off names of wards of Petitioners No. 25 and 27.

5. *Per contra*, Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, counsel for the School, states that names of wards of Petitioners No. 25 and 27 have not been struck off. Her statement is taken on record.

6. The Court has heard counsel for the parties on this aspect.

7. There is merit in the submission of Mr. Bhushan that the order should apply to all Petitioners arrayed as parties. The Court took note of contention of Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the School, that some of the students, who are Petitioners before this Court, had paid or were in the process of disbursing fees, nevertheless, interim order dated 12th October, 2022 must apply uniformly. It is therefore clarified that *ad-interim* direction contained in paragraph No. 8 of the said order would apply to all Petitioners arrayed as parties to the present petition, including those who have now been impleaded as parties to present petition.

8. Ms. Mendiratta submits that direction of 50% payment of fee has not complied with by all the Petitioners which is controverted by Mr. Bhushan. Before delving into this disputed arena, counsel for the parties must correspond with each other on this aspect and clarify the same.

9. It is further clarified that this order will apply with respect to past

dues and fee payable from the month of November, 2022 onwards shall be paid in full, subject to final outcome of the present petition.

10. With the above directions, the application stands disposed of.

W.P.(C) 14473/2022

11. It is noted that there is no counter affidavit on behalf of Respondents No. 1 and 2. The same be positively filed at least one week before the next date of hearing. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed five days thereafter.

12. Parties are directed to file brief note of submissions, not exceeding three pages, along with relevant case law(s), if any, within a period of two weeks from today. Copy thereof be e-mailed to the Ld. Court Master, within the same timelines.

13. List on the date already fixed, *i.e.*, 02nd December, 2022 at 02:30 PM.

SANJEEV NARULA, J

NOVEMBER 18, 2022

d.negi



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ W.P.(C) 7481/2017 & CM APPL. 30818/2017

DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL VASANT KUNJ AND ANR

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR

..... Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 8071/2017 & CM APPL. 33212/2017

DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL ROHINI AND ANR

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR

..... Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 8553/2017 & CM APPL. 35214/2017

DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL VASANT VIHAR AND ANR.

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR.

..... Respondents

Through: Mr.Anuj Aggarwal, ASC, GNCTD,
Ms.Ayushi Bansal and Ms.Arshya Singh,
Advocates for R-1 & 2.

+ W.P.(C) 8970/2017 & CM APPL. 36716/2017

DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL DWARKA & ANR

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.



-2-

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 11653/2022 & CM APPL. 34573/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL DWARKA AND ANR Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GNCTD AND ANR Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 12232/2022 & CM APPL. 36665/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL DWARKA & ANR. Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 12254/2022 & CM APPL. 36724/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL DWARKA & ANR. Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondents

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 14473/2022
DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS Petitioners

Through: Mr.Hitendra Kr.Nahata and Ms.Surbhi
Tandon, Advocates.



-3-

versus

GOVT OF GNCT AND ORS & ORS. Respondents
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates
for R-3.

+ W.P.(C) 15118/2022 & CM APPL. 46754/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL ROHINI AND ANR Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 396/2023 & CM APPL. 1588/2023
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL R.K. PURAM & ANR. Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 399/2023 & CM APPL. 1598/2023
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL R.K. PURAM & ANR. Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.
Mr.Akasnsh Singhal and Mr.S.P.Malik,
Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 430/2023 & CM APPL. 1709/20203
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL R.K. PURAM & ANR. Petitioners



-4-

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. Respondents
Through:

+ W.P.(C) 15754/2022 & CM APPL. 49028/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL VASANT KUNJ AND ANR Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 15868/2022 & CM APPL. 49381/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL VASANT KUNJ AND ANR Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR Respondents
Through:
+ W.P.(C) 15872/2022 & CM APPL. 49396/2022
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL VASANT KUNJ AND ANR Petitioners
Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR Respondents



-5-

Through:

+ W.P.(C) 17102/2022 & CM APPLs. 54281/2022, 7507/2023
DELHI PUBLIC SCHOOL ROHINI & ANR. Petitioners

Through: Mr.Puneet Mittal, Sr.Advocate with
Mr.R.P.Singh and Mr.Mohit Chandras, Advocates.
Mr.J.S.Lamba and Mr.Ashutosh Das, Advocates.
versus

GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.

..... Respondents

Through:

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV

ORDER

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13.03.2023

CM APPL. 31/2023

1. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner seeks clarification to the effect as to how, the fees is to be paid by him.
2. Having perused the order passed by this court, from time to time this court clarifies that till October, 2022 the petitioner was under an obligation to make payment of 50 per cent of outstanding amount of fees proposed by the petitioner-institution for the academic year 2022-2023 and from November, 2022 onwards, he has to pay the full fees as proposed by the petitioner-institution for the academic year 2022-2023.
3. With the aforesaid clarification, the application stands disposed of.

W.P.(C) 7481/2017, W.P.(C) 8071/2017, W.P.(C) 8553/2017, W.P.(C) 8970/2017, W.P.(C) 11653/2022 , W.P.(C) 12232/2022 , W.P.(C) 12254/2022 , W.P.(C) 14473/2022 , W.P.(C) 15118/2022 , W.P.(C) 396/2023 , W.P.(C) 399/2023 , W.P.(C) 430/2023 , W.P.(C) 15754/2022 W.P.(C) 15868/2022 , W.P.(C) 15872/2022 , W.P.(C) 17102/2022



-6-

1. List on 04.05.2023 along with W.P.(C) 11669/2022.
2. In the meantime, the parties are at liberty to complete the pleadings.
3. Interim order to continue till the next date of hearing.

PURUSHAINDR KUMAR KAURAV, J

MARCH 13, 2023/MJ



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 14473/2022**

DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS

..... Petitioners

Through: Mr. Hitendra Kr. Nahata, Mr. Kajol Kumar and Mr. Alok Kr. Rout, Advocates.

versus

GOVT OF GNCT AND ORS & ORS.

..... Respondents

Through: Ms. Prashansa Sharma, Advocate for Mr. Santosh Kr. Tripathi, Standing Counsel (Civil) GNCTD for R-1 and R-2.

Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior Advocate with Ms. Sakshi Mendiratta, Advocate for R-3/DPS Dwarka.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

ORDER

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18.08.2023

CM APPL. 42556/2023 (Exemption)

Exemption granted, subject to just exceptions.

Let requisite compliances be made within 01 week.

The application stands disposed of.

CM APPL. 42555/2023

By way of the present application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the petitioner seeks ad-interim relief



by way of a direction that respondent No. 3/Delhi Public School, Dwarka be restrained from charging the hiked fee, which the petitioners' contend has not been approved by the Directorate of Education ('DoE'); and further that the school should grant adjustment against the excess fee paid by the petitioners from 18.11.2022 onwards.

2. The petitioners rely on order dated 03.04.2019 made by a Division Bench of this court in LPA No.230/2019, whereby all schools with a 'land clause' in their allotment were prohibited from collecting interim fee hike in terms of circular dated 17.10.2017 issued by the DoE. This order was made absolute *vide* order dated 27.10.2022 made in the said matter alongwith other connected matter.
3. However, as pointed-out by Mr. Puneet Mittal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent school, *vide* orders dated 12.10.2022, 18.11.2022, 13.03.2023 and 25.05.2023, on applications filed by the petitioners themselves, certain other arrangements were put in place under orders of the court in relation to payment of fee by the petitioners. Mr. Mittal points-out that those arrangements were put in place *ad-invitem* at the behest of the petitioners which have not been honoured by them.
4. The main writ petition is listed for consideration, alongwith several other petitions of the batch, on 06th September 2023.
5. In the circumstances, this court is not inclined to entertain the present application, which is accordingly dismissed *in-limine*; without however expressing any opinion on the merits of the contentions raised therein.



6. The application stands disposed-of.

W.P.(C) 14473/2022

7. Re-notify on 06th September 2023, the date already fixed.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

AUGUST 18, 2023/ak

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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**

+ **W.P.(C) 8466/2022**

**MASTER DIVYAM BHATEJA THROUGH FATHER MR VINOD
BHATEJA Petitioner**

Through: Mr. Khagesh B. Jha, Adv.

Versus

BHAI PARMANAND VIDYA MANDIR AND ORS..... Respondents

Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi, SC
along with Mr. Arun Panwar, Mr.
Siddharth Krishna Dwivedi, Mr.
Aditya S. Jadhav, Mr. Pradyumn Rao,
Mr. HF Sachdeva and Ms. Savita
Sethi, Advs. for DOE.
Mr. Kamal Gupta, Mr. Sparsh
Aggarwal, Ms. Sonakshi and Mr.
Ryan Sinha, Advs. Resp/School.
Mr. Shobhana Takiar, SC for R-4
/DDA.

**CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA**

ORDER

% **27.05.2022**

CM APPL. 25533/2022

Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.

The application stands disposed of.

W.P.(C) 8466/2022 & CM APPL. 25532/2022

1. The instant petition has been preferred by the petitioner seeking the following reliefs:

“a. Pass an order to declare rules 35 and 167 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973, ultravirous to article 19(1)(a), 21 and 21A of constitution of India read with provisions of Right of Children to free and compulsory Education Act, 2009 and contrary to the provisions of section 75 of Juvenile Justice care and Protection Act, 2015.

b. Pass an order to declare the impugned order dated 18.04.2020 passed by the director of education along with subsequent circulars reiterating the same to facilitate the private schools of Delhi to collect the tuition fee without filing of the revised statement of fee and charging for the expenses neither occurred nor any probability of occurring during the lock down ultra virous to section 17(3) and 18 of Delhi School Education Act, 1973 and also ultravirous to rule 165 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.

c. to pass an order writ or direction to quash the impugned communication of striking down the name of petitioner from the role of school in the violation of undertaking given by the school through their association and in the deliberate disobedience of direction issued by the division bench of this Hon'ble court based on fee bill generated contrary to the provisions of rule 165 of Delhi School Education Rules 1973.

d. To pass an appropriate writ order or direction to quash the demand of fee without prior sanction of director of education government of NCT of Delhi and without following the orders passed by the division benches of this Hon'ble court in LPA No. 230 of 2019 & W.P.(c) No. 11265 of 2017 and order passed by Ld. Single Judge in W.P.(c) No. 6161 of 2019.

e. to pass an appropriate order writ or direction to direct the respondent school not to force the petitioner for charity by paying the fee for the education of children belonging to weaker section and disadvantage group which is being already funded by the appropriate government and direct there is provision of arrangement of fund from sources other than the school fee mentioned under rule 175 of Delhi School Education Rules, 1973

f. pass an appropriate writ order or direction to direct the respondent director of education and the Delhi Development authority to ensure that the school should not be allowed to increase the fee without prior sanction from the Director of Education govt of NCT of Delhi and initiate appropriate action against the school

management for the violation of terms of allotment of the land allotted to them at highly concessional rates.

g. Pass an order directing the respondent comptroller and auditor general of India for the timebound audit of the account of the respondent school and determine the fee to be payable by the petitioner.

h. Allow the writ petition with cost.”

2. At the outset, we must note that with regard to prayers (b)-(h) reproduced herein above, a Single Judge of this court is already seized of an identical matter in Writ Petition No.3330/2022. It has been brought to our attention that the challenge in the said Petition is to the fees demanded by the same school qua another child of the father of the petitioner herein. We, thus feel that it would be appropriate that prayers (b) – (h) be considered alongwith Writ Petition No.3330/2022.

3. We now proceed to examine prayer (a) of the petitioner with regard to the validity of Rule 35 and 167 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.

4. Rules 35 and 167 of the Delhi School Education Rules are reproduced below:-

“35. Striking off the name from the rolls

(1) The name of a student may be struck off the rolls by the head of the school on account of:

(a) non-payment of fees and other dues for 20 days after the last day for payment: Provided that nothing in this rule shall apply in case students of class VIII and below, studying in Government or aided schools, or in schools run or aided by the appropriate authority, except where such students have attained the age of fourteen years;

(b) continued absence without leave for six consecutive days by a student who has attained the age of fourteen years.

(2) In the case of absence of any student who has not attained the age of fourteen years, from a school without leave for six consecutive days, the head of school shall intimate such absence to the parent or guardian of such student.

(3) In respect of payment of fees, however the head of school may grant not more than 10 days' of grace in deserving cases on application by the parent or guardian.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), no student's name shall be struck off the rolls except after giving the parent or guardian of such student a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action.

167. Name of the student to be struck off for non-payment of fees and contributions.

If a student omits or fails to pay the fees and contributions due to a school together with the fine due thereon by the last working day of the month in which they are due, his name shall be struck off the rolls of the school on the last working day of the month and may be re-admitted on payment of all school dues including fresh admission fee:

Provided that in the case of non-payment of fees for the month of May in which the school closes in the middle of the month for long vacation, the name of the student shall be struck off on the last working day of the month of July, if the fees remains unpaid up to that day.”

5. The challenge of the petitioner is premised on the submission that the aforesaid Rules impinge upon the operation of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (*hereinafter referred as, RTE Act*).

6. At the outset, we may notice that the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 was enacted for better organisation and development of school education in the Union Territory of Delhi and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The very object and purpose of this enactment is to improve the standard and management of school education. The rule making power in the said Act is contained in Section 28 (2). The rule making power extends to a wide gamut of areas, all concerned with meeting the prescribed standards of education and to ensure good governance practices in schools on Delhi.

7. The RTE Act was enacted in 2009 to give effect to the fundamental right inserted via Article 21A of the Constitution of India. The main purpose

of the RTE Act is to provide for free and compulsory education to all children of the age of 6-14 years. To achieve the same, various provisions have been inserted in the said enactment. Section 12 of the said Act delineates the extent of responsibilities of the school for free and compulsory education qua government schools, aided schools and un-aided schools.

8. The RTE Act is a self contained legislation and the operation thereof is unhindered by the Delhi School Education Act and Rules framed thereunder. As a matter of fact, there are independent Rules framed under the RTE Act, namely, the Right of Children to School and Compulsory Education Rules, 2010. The concerned Act along with the Rules contain self-contained provisions for effectuating and achieving the purposes of the Act and assigns responsibilities to schools, parents, the concerned local authorities, the concerned appropriate government, which all are within the ambit of the Act.

9. Given the independent and distinct framework of Delhi School Education Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and the RTE Act and the rules framed thereunder, there can be no question of Rules 35 and 167 of Delhi School Education Rules impinging upon the operation of the RTE Act. The RTE Act guarantees the right to education. However, it nowhere provides that the said right can be unconditionally enforced against a private unaided school. The petitioner is free to take admission in a government school if he cannot afford to pay the fee of the private unaided school. If he is entitled to admission in the EWS category, he may apply under that category to seek waiver of the school fee. If the claim of the petitioner were to be allowed, it would mean that even a private unaided school would not

be able to charge any fee even though they have to meet all their expenses from their own resources and accretions. This is completely untenable.

10. Likewise, the impugned Rules 35 and 167 of Delhi School Education Schools do not impinge upon or affect in any manner the operation of Sections 75 of Juvenile Justice Act. The said provision has been enacted in a completely different context and reads as under:

“75. Whoever, having the actual charge of, or control over, a child, assaults, abandons, abuses, exposes or wilfully neglects the child or causes or procures the child to be assaulted, abandoned, abused, exposed or neglected in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary mental or physical suffering, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine of one lakh rupees or with both:

Provided that in case it is found that such abandonment of the child by the biological parents is due to circumstances beyond their control, it shall be presumed that such abandonment is not wilful and the penal provisions of this section shall not apply in such cases:

Provided further that if such offence is committed by any person employed by or managing an organisation, which is entrusted with the care and protection of the child, he shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment which may extend up to five years, and fine which may extend up to five lakhs rupees:

Provided also that on account of the aforesaid cruelty, if the child is physically incapacitated or develops a mental illness or is rendered mentally unfit to perform regular tasks or has risk to life or limb, such person shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment, not less than three years but which may be extended up to ten years and shall also be liable to fine of five lakhs rupees.”

11. There is no repugnancy whatsoever between the aforesaid Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 and the impugned Rules 35 and 167 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973.

12. In the light of the aforesaid position, we reject the challenge to the vires of Rules 35 and 167 of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973. As far as the other prayers of the petitioner are concerned, the matter be listed before the concerned court, which is seized of the W.P. No.3330/2022 on

the date already fixed.

13. Needless to say, the prayers “(b)-(h)” raised by the petitioner shall be examined by the Ld. Single Judge on their own merits. All rights and contentions of the parties with regard thereto are left open.

VIPIN SANGHI, ACJ

SACHIN DATTA, J

MAY 27, 2022/cl



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* **IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI**
+ **W.P.(C) 14473/2022 & CM APPLs. 27715/2023 & 27726/2023**
DIVYA MATTEY AND ORS Petitioners

Through: Mr. Hitendra Kr. Nahata with
Ms. Surbhi Tandon, Advocates.
(M): 8800634000

Email: nahata.company@gmail.com

versus

GOVT OF GNCT AND ORS. Respondents

Through: Mr. Santosh Kumar Tripathi,
SC, GNCTD with Mr. Utkarsh
Singh, Advocate.
(M): 9129829862

Email: scgnctd@gmail.com

Mr. Puneet Mittal, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Rupendra
Pratap Singh, Ms. Sakshi
Mendiratta and Ms. Varnika
Gupta, Advocates for
respondent no. 3.
(M): 9818928506

CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MINI PUSHKARNA

ORDER

25.05.2023

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[Physical Hearing/ Hybrid Hearing]

CM APPL. 27715/2023 (Application on behalf of the applicants under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC seeking permission for impleadment as petitioners in the present case)

1. The present is an application on behalf of applicants under Order 1 Rule 10 read with Section 151 CPC seeking permission for impleadment as petitioners in the present case.
2. The present application has been filed by 26 applicants who are



the parents of the students who are getting education in respective classes in the respondent no. 3 school.

3. It is submitted that the applicants also wish to join the proceedings in the present petition and contest the present case along with existing petitioners. It is further submitted that the interest of the applicants are common as that of existing petitioners towards respondent.

4. Issue notice.

5. Notice is accepted by learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 and 2/DOE and learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no. 3 school.

6. Considering the submissions made in the present application, the application is allowed and the applicants are allowed to join as petitioners in the present writ petition.

7. Let amended memo of parties be filed within one week.

8. With the aforesaid directions, the present application is disposed of.

CM APPL. 27726/2023 (Application on behalf of the petitioners under Section 151 CPC seeking appropriate directions pertaining to academic year 2023-2024)

9. The present is an application on behalf of the petitioners under Section 151 CPC seeking appropriate directions pertaining to academic session 2023-2024.

10. It is submitted that this Court earlier by its order dated 18.11.2022 and 13.03.2023 had passed directions, wherein it had been directed that till October, 2022, the fees shall be paid to the extent of 50% of the outstanding fees as proposed by the petitioner institution



for the academic year 2022-2023. It had further been directed that from November, 2022 onwards, the petitioners will pay full fees as proposed by the petitioner institution for the academic year 2022-2023.

11. The present application has been filed, since it is the contention on behalf of the petitioners that the respondent school is now charging further enhanced fee with effect from 01.04.2023 for the academic session 2023-2024.

12. Issue notice.

13. Notice is accepted by learned counsels appearing for respondents.

14. Mr. Puneet Mittal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent school submits that even in the last academic year of 2022-2023, fee had been hiked by the school and that the fees as being charged by the school is on the basis of the hiked fee. He further submits that a fresh proposal for fee hike for the current academic session 2023-2024 has already been submitted with the DOE.

15. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the DOE vehemently opposes the said submission made on behalf of the respondent school.

16. Learned counsel appearing for the DOE relies upon order dated 05.08.2022 passed in *W.P. (C) 11653/2022*, wherein a statement had been recorded on behalf of the school that the hiked fees has not been charged from the students for the relevant academic year 2019-2020.

17. Learned counsel for the DOE further relies upon the order dated 06.10.2022 issued by the Deputy Director of Education (Directorate of



Education) (Private School Branch), wherein it is recorded that fee hike proposal of the schools have become infructuous.

18. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the school submits that the order dated 05.08.2022 in W.P. (C) 11653/2022 pertained only to the academic year 2019-2020 and cannot be considered to extend to the subsequent academic years.

19. Reply be filed within two weeks. Rejoinder thereto, if any, be filed within one week thereafter.

20. In the meanwhile, it is directed that the petitioners shall continue to pay the fees in terms of the order dated 13.03.2023 passed by this Court. It is further clarified that the fees payable by the petitioners shall be as payable for the academic year 2022-2023, subject to modification by this Court on subsequent dates, if such request is made before this Court.

21. As far as the issue with respect to penalty charges being levied by the school for late fees is concerned, the said issue shall be decided at the time of final hearing of the matter.

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22. List on 20.07.2023, date already fixed.

23. It is pointed out by learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that various proposals of different schools for enhancement of fees are pending with the Directorate of Education.

24. The Directorate of Education is directed to dispose of all such representations, as may be pending before it before the next date of hearing.

25. It is further clarified that in view of the enhanced fee that may



have been charged by the respondent school for the months of April 2023 and May 2023, the issue with respect to refund of excess amount, if any, for the months of April 2023 and May 2023, shall be considered at the time of final hearing of the present writ petition.

MINI PUSHKARNA, J

MAY 25, 2023

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